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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-203. Seals Inoperative
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a contract for sale or
an offer to buy or sell goods does not constitute the writing a sealed in-
strument and the law with respect to sealed instruments does not apply
to such a contract or offer.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
COMMONWEALTH BANK & TRUST CO V KEECH
— Pa. Super. —, 192 A.2d 133 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-602(1), infra.
SECTION 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage
of Trade
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section
the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sole.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all
units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied war-
ranties may arise from courses of dealing or usage of trade.
ANNOTATION
BENAVIDES V. STOP & SHOP, INC.
— Mass. —, 190 N.E.2d 894 (1963)
In 1959, the plaintiff buyer purchased from the defendant seller a bar
of soap said on the label to be "99 44/100% pure." In an action for damages
based on a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, the buyer alleged
that some of the soap got in her eye while washing and that an eye injury
developed immediately thereafter. Buyer introduced evidence showing that
her eye was, in fact, injured, and that she suffered pain and was treated by
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an infirmary for this injury. She did not, however, offer any evidence which
established that the soap was the probable cause of her injury. The seller
appealed from a denial of its motion for a directed verdict.
On appeal, the court reversed and entered judgment for the seller, holding
that although a buyer need not exclude all possible causes of his injury, he
must prove that a warranty was breached and that the breach "proximately
caused" his injury. This holding was based upon Section 2-314 and prior
cases which require that one whose suit is for a breach of warranty must prove
the breach was the probable cause of his injury in order to prevail.
COMMENT
Section 2-314 clearly outlines some of the criteria for merchantability. To
prove these, a plaintiff must revert to the rules of evidence. Courts are re-
luctant to allow a recovery to one who merely establishes a sale and an injury;
the Massachusetts Court strictly requires that he show that the item bought
was the probable cause of the harm.
B.M.H.
SECTION 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express
or Implied
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of
the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this sec-
tion.
ANNOTATION
WILSON V. AMERICAN CHAIN & CABLE CO., INC.
216 F. Supp. 32 (ED. Pa. 1963)
The plaintiff's minor son was injured while riding a rotary power lawn
mower manufactured by the defendant. The court denied a motion to strike
the defense that there was no privity of contract and held that the plaintiff
"may well be able to prove that the manufacturer either by means of national
advertising, labels, manuals, or legend upon the container intended either an
express or implied warranty to flow through the 'conduit of the contractual
chain' to the sub-purchaser and his family under § 2-318." The court stated
that while privity had seemed to have been abandoned in Pennsylvania by a
series of cases, the recent Supreme Court case of Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Co.
(annotated in 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 612 (1963)) "injected new life
into the privity defense." Thus, the plaintiff would have to bring himself care-
fully within the confines of that or other cases where privity had not been
required.
COMMENT
The requirements which the Pennsylvania court seems to have established
to avoid the privity defense are (1) that the party alleging the breach be a
purchaser or subpurchaser and (2) that the warranty from the remote seller,
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express or implied, form "part of the consideration for the purchase."
The distributive chain through which the warranty must flow means a series
of sales; such arrangements as bailments or leases at any point in the chain
would break the conduit.
The court in the instant case indicates that if the father as purchaser
can prove these requirements, the injured son then may recover by virtue of
Section 2-318,
The Pennsylvania court has not only raised the old bogey that there
must be a contractual relationship in the form of a sale, even though the
warranty need not be from the immediate seller, but also has added a "con-
sideration" requirement almost impossible to prove in an implied warranty
situation since the very distinction between express and implied warranties is
that express warranties form a "basis of the bargain" while implied warranties
are imposed by law where the parties did not consider them at all. The "new
life" which the Pennsylvania court has injected into the privity doctrine has
created a monster as bad as the one which appears to have died.
R.I.D.
ANNOTATION
*SimpsoN V. POWERED PRODS., INC.
24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (1963)
Plaintiff rented a powered golf cart from Gerardi, who had purchased the
cart from a retailer-distributor, who in turn had purchased it from the manu-
facturer. Plaintiff was injured when the arm and back rests of the cart fell
apart and brought an action for breach of "express and/or implied warranty"
joining Gerardi, the retailer-distributor and the manufacturer as defendants.
The retailer-distributor demurred to the complaint on the ground that there
was neither privity of contract with, nor a sale to the plaintiff.
The court overruled the demurrer and held that the rental agreement was
a contractual relationship, as was a sale, and since the golf cart was intended
for use by the general public in the same manner in which plaintiff used it,
it would be illogical to allow Gerardi to recover from the retailer and deny a
similar right to plaintiff. In reaching this decision the court expanded the
holding of Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961), to in-
clude a lessee as well as a buyer to prevent the circuity of action discussed in
that case. This result would be in line with decisions of other jurisdictions.
The court noted that the Code, effective subsequent to the transaction, ex-
panded a non-privity provision in Connecticut's Sales Act by including goods
other than food and drink within the warranty obligation while contracting
the extension of the warranty from those "for whom . . . intended" to the
limited groups designated in Section 2-318.
COMMENT
On the basis of the prior Connecticut decision, the court established its
own rule extending the warranty protection for all goods to those whom a
seller intended to use them. In keeping with the Digliani rationale, the court
went so far as to take judicial notice of the fact that golf carts are advertised
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
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for use and used extensively upon a rental basis at golf courses. Thus, the
seller's "intended use and users" were found automatically. The court re-
jected the artificiality of the requirement imposed by some courts that there
be a sale, rather than some other contractual relationship, at every stage of
the distributive chain before the warranty will be extended. In fact, in the
circuity discussion, it was tacitly assumed that the lessor had undertaken
warranty obligations to the lessee even though there had been no sale.
B.M.H.
SECTION 2-328. Sale by Auction
(3) Such a sale is with reserve unless the goods are in explicit terms
put up without reserve. In' an auction with reserve the auctioneer may
withdraw the goods at any time until he announces completion of the sale.
In an auction without reserve, after the auctioneer calls for bids on an
article or lot, that article or lot cannot be withdrawn unless no bid is
made within a reasonable time. In either case a bidder may retract his
bid until the auctioneer's announcement of completion of the sale, but a
bidder's retraction does not revive any previous bid.
(4) If the auctioneer knowingly receives a bid on the seller's behalf
or the seller makes or procures such a bid, and notice has not been given
that liberty for such bidding is reserved, the buyer may at his option avoid
the sale or take the goods at the price of the last good faith bid prior
to the completion of the sale. This subsection shall not apply to any bid at
a forced sale.
ANNOTATION
*DREW V. JOHN DEERE CO
— App. Div. 2d —, 241 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1963)
The defendant advertised an auction sale at which a tractor repossessed .
from a defaulting vendee under a conditional sales contract would be sold to
the highest bidder. The plaintiff bid at the sale, but the auctioneer struck
down the property to the defendant who had bid the next higher amount. The
bidder brought an action alleging that his highest bid, except for defendant's,
resulted in a contract. Motions to strike the seller's answer and for summary
judgment were denied by the lower court.
On appeal, the court in sustaining the lower court held that under the
controlling Section 102(2) of the New York Personal Property Law (Uniform
Sales Act, § 21) unless the bidder can prove that the auction was "without
reserve", the seller may reject any bid at the sale. Subsection (4) of the same
section provides that a sale is fraudulent only when a bid has been accepted
at an auction at which the seller had bid without previously reserving the right
to bid. Since plaintiff's bid had not been accepted by the auctioneer, there
was no sale to him which could have been unlawful. The court indicated that
the result would be the same under Section 2-328 of the Code.
COMMENT
The implication from this decision is that Subsection (4) of Section 2-328
can apply only if the auction was "without reserve" or if the bid was actually
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
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accepted by the auctioneer. In short, it may not be used to establish a contract
for sale, but only to avoid one which at some time came into existence.
R.I.D.
SECTION 2-401. Passing of Title; Reservation for Security;
Limited Application of This Section
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations
and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties
applies irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers
to such title. Insofar as situations are not covered by the other provisions
of this Article and matters concerning title become material the following
rules apply:
(2) Unless'otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the
time and place at which the seller completes his performance with refer-
ence to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a
security interest and even though a document of title is to be delivered at a
different time or place; and in particular and despite any reservation of a
security interest by the bill of lading
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send the
goods to the buyer but does not require him to deliver them
at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time and place
of shipment; but
(b) if the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes on
tender there.
ANNOTATION
SEMPLE V. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO .
215 F. Supp. 645 (ED. Pa. 1963)
Pursuant to an agreement to sell his car, seller parked his car late at
night at the buyer's place of employment, gave the buyer the keys and a
signed but unacknowledged Pennsylvania certificate of title and collected the
balance of the purchase price. They agreed to meet the following business day
to have the certificate notarized in accordance with local law, but before this
could be done, the buyer drove the car and injured a third person who suc-
cessfully brought an action against the buyer. The seller's insurer refused to
defend that action or to pay the judgment. In the buyer's subsequent action
against the insurer the court held that title had passed to the buyer when the
car was finally and physically delivered by the seller under Section 2-401
which deprived the seller, as the "named insured" under the policy, of the
power to give anyone "permission" to drive the car to effect his coverage by
the policy's further definition of "insured."
The court, in awarding judgment to State Farm, also held that the fact
that the certificate of title had not been notarized did not alter the result.
Notarization was not essential to the completion of the sale according to
Pennsylvania decisions.
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COMMENT
This result would not necessarily obtain in other Code states having
certificate of title laws. If compliance in all respects with such laws is con-
sidered by the courts to be essential to the transfer of ownership in the auto-
mobile, then the seller on the above facts would remain the owner and the
buyer would be driving with his permission within the terms of the policy.
See Eggerding v. Bicknell, 20 N.J. 106, 118 A.2d 820 (1955).
S.L.P.
SECTION 2-601. Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment con-
tracts (Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on
contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods
or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract,
the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
CARTER, MOORE & CO. V. DONAHUE
— Mass. —, 189 N.E.2d 217 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-709(2), infra.
SECTION 2-602. Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their
delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the
seller.
ANNOTATION
COMMONWEALTH BANK & TRUST CO. V. KEECH
— Pa. Super. —, 192 A.2d 133 (1963)
The defendant buyer purchased an automobile from a dealer under a
sealed installment sales contract which was assigned to a loan company and
later reassigned to the plaintiff bank. Customers of the dealer were brought
to a franchised agency by the dealer, and were sold cars upon which was the
name of the agency. At the time of this sale, the dealer owed the agency for
six other automobiles. The buyer, upon discovering that the agency retained
title in the automobile, refused to pay on the note because of failure of con-
sideration, and subsequently returned the automobile to the agency although
the bank had asked that it be returned to them. The lower court, in refusing
to open a judgment by confession against the buyer, held that the transfers
of the automobile between the agency and the dealer, and the dealer and
buyer were complete sales, and the buyer, upon learning he would not re-
ceive good title, failed to act promptly in rescinding.
On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, holding. that if the fact-
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finder determines that the dealer was an agent of the franchised agency as
undisclosed principal, the dealer was a party to the contract even though it
was under seal. Section 2-203 affords the seal no special significance. If this
was so, any defense the buyer had against the seller would be valid against the
assignee bank under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Financing Act.
Although the court did not decide whether the unsuccessful attempts of the
buyer to obtain a certificate of title from the dealer and the subsequent return
of the automobile at the inducement of the dealer was a rejection within a
reasonable time and effective under Section 2-602(1), it did hold that the
dealer and its assignees were estopped from raising that question because of
the dealer's acceptance of the automobile.
COMMENT
Section 2-602 (1) provides the manner in which a buyer may rightfully
reject goods tendered. The buyer must seasonably notify the seller of his
rejection. Although this decision is a proper one, it should be noted that this
court has introduced into Section 2-602(1) the concept of estoppel when the
goods have been returned to and accepted by the seller, regardless of the
buyer's failure to meet the requirement of seasonable notification. Under
Section 1-103, the estoppel principle may still be applied in states using the
Code, and Section 1-207 allows the reservation of rights by the accepting party
in order to avoid such a result.
For clarity, however, once the buyer had accepted the automobile as his
own, he could no longer "reject" it; instead, his remedy was revocation of
acceptance under Section 2-608 which contains its own requirement of noti-
fication to the seller. The Code has purposely avoided the use of the word
"rescission." This would not alter the result in this case.
SECTION 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole
or in Part
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit
whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has ac-
cepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would
be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance
was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery
before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and
before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not
caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the
seller of it
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with re-
gard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.
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CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
COMMONWEALTH BANK & TRUST CO. V. KEECH
— Pa. Super. —, 192 A.2d 133 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-602(1), supra.
SECTION 2-709. Action for the Price
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for the buyer
any goods which have been identified to the contract and are still in his
control except that if resale becomes possible he may resell them at any
time prior to the collection of the judgment. The net proceeds of any such
resale must be credited to the buyer and payment of the judgment en-
titles him to any goods not resold.
ANNOTATION
CARTER, MOORE & CO. V. DONAHUE
— Mass. —, 189 N.E.2d 217 (1963)
On January 15, 1960, the plaintiff (seller) sold to the defendant (buyer)
a quantity of wool which the buyer refused to accept because it was allegedly
different from the selling sample. Pursuant to the sales contract, which con-
tained a broad arbitration clause, and after the buyer refused the seller's offer
to reimburse him for the alleged difference, an arbitrator was appointed who
decided that the buyer must accept immediate delivery of and pay for the
goods, and until then, the quality of the goods would not be considered. The
arbitration clause stated that the decision of the arbitrator would be final and
binding. The lower court upheld the decision of the arbitrators and denied a
motion for a new trial based on proferred new evidence showing that the bales
of wool had been subsequently resold by the seller.
On appeal, the court affirmed, upholding the decision of the arbitrator as
well as the denial of a new trial. It reasoned that under Section 2-709(2), a
seller may resell the goods so long as the proceeds are credited to the judgment
against the buyer, and nothing to the contrary was here indicated.
COMMENT
The court, by following Section 2-709(2), correctly placed the burden
of proving the misapplication of proceeds of a resale upon the buyer to in-
validate the resale; whereas the prior law (Uniform Sales Act, Section 63)
allowed a resale of the goods only upon the seller's showing that the goods
could not later be resold. However, absent the arbitration clause where the
parties had agreed to abide by this decision, the result probably would have
been different. Section 2 -601 allows a buyer to reject the whole order if any
part of it fails to conform to the contract and recover damages without any
obligation to first pay for the goods rightfully rejected. R.I.D.
SECTION 2-714. Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard
to Accepted Goods
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the differ-
ence at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods
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accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as war-
ranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a dif-
ferent amount.
ANNOTATION
tKEYSTONE DIESEL ENGINE CO. V. IRWIN
— Pa. —, 191 A.2d 376 (1963)
The plaintiff Keystone sold the defendant a diesel engine which the de-
fendant installed in a tractor. When the engine proved defective, the plaintiff
undertook repairs, at first at its own expense, but later pursuant to an alleged
oral contract calling for the payment of additional work. This payment not
forthcoming, the plaintiff sued in assumpsit. The defendant counterclaimed,
alleging breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and demanding con-
sequential damages in the amount of the profits he had lost as a result of the
engine failure. The lower court struck the counterclaim on the basis that the
claim for loss of profits was too speculative to permit recovery.
Upon appeal, the court affirmed, holding that in the absence of the
"special circumstances" mentioned in Section 2-714(2), consequential dam-
ages could not be awarded. Such "special circumstances," the court said, are
shown to ". . . exist where the buyer has communicated to the seller at the
time of entering into the contract sufficient facts to make it apparent that
the damages subsequently claimed were within the reasonable contemplation
of the parties."
COMMENT
The term "within the contemplation of the parties" is not used by the
UCC. Section 2-715(2) (a) uses the test of "general or particular require-
ments and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to
know. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) This does not necessarily suggest "con-
templation" and clearly does not require, as does the court, that the damages
be at least impliedly "bargained for." The court would have been on more
solid ground had it held that this was not a "proper case" for consequential
damages, as required by Section 2-714(3). The "special circumstances" of
Subsection (2) does not refer to consequential damages. Further, recovery
of consequential damages has been qualified by the Code to the extent that a
buyer cannot recover damages for those losses which could have been pre-
vented by cover or otherwise.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania chose to construe the consequential
damages provisions in the Code in the terminology of the common law. De-
fining new law in terms appropriate to the old tends to discourage close study
of the new law, and the result of this could be that the intent of the draftsmen
may not be wholly effected.
S.L.P.
SECTION 2-715. Buyer's Incidental and Consequential
Damages
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach in-
clude
f Based on 1953 Code. • •
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(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented
by cover or otherwise;
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
f KEYSTONE DIESEL ENGINE CO. V. IRWIN
— Pa. —, 191 A.2d 376 (1963)
See the annotation to Section 2-714(2), supra.
SECTION 2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts
for Sale
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original
agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitations to not less
than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of war-
ranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a war-
ranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery
of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of ac-
tion accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsec-
tion (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action
for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the ex-
piration of the time limited and within six months after the termination
of the first action unless the termination resulted from a voluntary dis-
continuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of
limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before
this Act becomes effective.
ANNOTATION
tHARVEY V. EIMCO CORP.
32 F.R.D. 598 (E D. Pa. 1963)
Harvey sustained personal injuries while operating a machine manu-
factured by defendant. An action was brought alleging breach of warranty
and negligence. Two years after the complaint was filed, defendant moved to
amend his answer to affirmatively assert the defense of the statute of limita-
tion. Harvey contended that the statute of limitations defense was insub-
stantial and frivolous. The court, in allowing the amendment, held that "it
did not believe that the statute of limitations argument is a frivolous one in
light of the apparently clear wording of the controlling statute. See 12A P.S.
§ 2-725.. .."
B.M.H.
Based on 1953 Code.
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